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Searching for an Executive Head? Leadership and UNAIDS  
Sophie Harman 
Abstract: Leadership is one of the central explanatory factors for change within international 
organisations, yet is often sidelined as a part of wider social processes or understood in the 
context of domestic and managerial political agency. This paper adopt one of the few 
understandings of leadership within international organisation – Robert Cox’s 1969 essay on 
the Executive Head – as an analytical model for understanding leadership within global 
HIV/AIDS governance. It does so by applying Cox’s framework of analysing the role of the 
executive head in relation to the international bureaucracy, member states, and the 
international system to the position of the ex-Executive Director of the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Peter Piot. The paper argues that the role of 
leadership transcends the agency of simply opening up the black box of international 
organisations, but is a realm of political knowledge and agenda-setting that is integral to the 
formation and subsequent longevity of international institutions, alliances, and the global 
issues that justify their existence. 
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Searching for an Executive Head? Leadership and UNAIDS 
 
Trends of institutional prominence and relevance within global health governance have often 
relied on the individual leadership of specific health organisations. New leadership can 
introduce vigour, direction, inertia and division between organisations. The Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) welcomes its new Executive Director, 
Michel Sidibe, at a time when leadership and direction has never been so important: the 
international community is concerned about a decline in funding and attention to the global 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the number of actors involved in the global response to the 
epidemic is at its confusing and contradictory height. Leadership is one of the central 
explanatory factors for change within international organisations, yet it is often sidelined as a 
part of wider social processes or under-theorised as a form of political agency. This paper 
argues that to understand the politics of global health, and specifically the politics of 
HIV/AIDS governance, one has to understand leadership. To do so it is vital to transcend 
descriptive analysis of institutional bickering and rivalry and adapt an analytical framework 
for the challenges of managing and sustaining an issue-specific international organisation. As 
such, this paper adopts one of the few understandings of leadership within international 
organisations - Robert Cox’s essay on the Executive Head – and applies it to the role of 
Peter Piot as Executive Director of UNAIDS, 1995 – 2008.  
 
The paper begins by reviewing how political leadership is conceptualised and how this 
conceptualisation pertains to understanding leadership within international organisation, 
before considering the context of leadership within the governance of HIV/AIDS. The 
paper then assesses the role of leadership within UNAIDS in regard to the international 
bureaucracy, the international system, and member states. Finally the paper draws together 
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the main issues associated with leadership and UNAIDS and how they relate to global 
governance more broadly.  
 
Leadership, Cox, and ‘the executive head’  
Writing in 1969, Cox’s basic premise is that ‘the quality of leadership may prove to be the 
most critical single determinant of the growth of in scope and authority of international 
organisation.’1 While there have been allusions to this being the case in regard to executive 
heads such as Kofi Annan when Secretary General of the United Nations (1997 – 2006) or 
James Wolfensohn as President of the World Bank (1995 – 2005), there has been little direct 
engagement with leadership as a form of agency independent of a specific international 
organisation within the study of global governance. Leadership has long been one of the 
central concerns of processes and understandings of power, from Plato, to Weber’s notion 
of legitimate authority and charismatic leadership2 to the presence of ‘big man’ or ‘alpha 
male’ leadership popular in psychological analysis.3 Leadership is often seen as somehow 
failing or inadequate, morally deficient and defined by charismatic individuals yet it is an 
integral feature of all organisations and economic and social development.4 Despite being a 
broad category of analysis, several themes can be discerned for understanding leadership.  
 
The most common, is the role or pre-dominance of charisma or what Weber terms a 
‘personal gift of grace’ derived from personal confidence and devotion on the part of the 
leader, passion, responsibility and a sense of proportion. Combined, these elements 
constitute a form of charismatic ‘hero’5 that becomes a central method of categorising 
different types of leadership.6 A second theme is why followers obey, nominally out of either 
hope or fear and executive loyalty from the spoils of leadership.7 Nye’s recent work on 
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leadership suggests it is not fear but followers’ need for meaning, cohesion, order and 
activity that infers authority to a leader. According to Nye, ‘smart power’ that builds upon 
leadership within and among followers is a central determinant of effective political 
leadership. ‘Smart power’ is the combination of hard and soft power that transcends the 
individual to recognise the power of dispersed leadership within communities and social 
movements by helping a group to achieve shared goals derived from either the group or the 
individual.8  
 
The final theme to be discerned from existing analysis on leadership is the importance of 
context and environment. It is this issue that perhaps pertains most crucially to 
understanding leadership within the context of international organisation. It is the 
environment or context in which leaders operate that give their actions political meaning and 
provide the arena in which to assess their quality ability to lead.9 The importance of 
environment for effective leadership requires a level of ‘contextual intelligence, combining 
skill and emotional intelligence.10 This intelligence in the domestic sense is required to 
manage constitutional power, personal responsibilities, and events and circumstances.11 
These arguments develop Cox’s over-arching framework for understanding leadership in 
international organisation as resting on the following relationships: the international 
bureaucracy, member states, and the international system.  
 
Based upon an ethical-normative approach to leadership, Cox utilises Haas’ model of 
executive leadership as organizational ideology + committed bureaucracy + supporting 
coalition as the basis of analysis of three key relationships between the executive head and 
the world environment: the international bureaucracy; member states; and the 
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international system. Haas perceives international organisation as a structure of 
‘institutionalized interest politics’ that ‘may well acquire the position of an autonomous 
actor at some future stage’ within a world environment or system.12 Executive leadership 
is considered a ‘politically adapted function’ that is able to manipulate certain input 
pressures and various conflicts within this environment that in turn enables the 
organization ‘to expand its tasks and enhance its authority’ whilst maintaining a link with 
the evolution of the world system.13 This politically adapted function has taken on its own 
form in relation to the governance of HIV/AIDS, particularly in the case of UNAIDS 
and its first Executive Director, Peter Piot. 
 
UNAIDS and leadership squabbles in governing HIV/AIDS 
Since its inception in 1995 and official launch in 1996, leadership has been central to the 
relevance and potential longevity of UNAIDS. The principle role of UNAIDS is to co-
ordinate UN efforts to combat HIV/AIDS at the global, regional and national level. It is to 
galvanise support and efforts for combating HIV/AIDS, provide strategic direction, support 
states with high HIV prevalence, and produce data on the status of the epidemic. The 
Executive Director of UNAIDS is responsible for the framing of the epidemic in such a way 
that gains global support, and crucially funding. UNAIDS must sustain a high level of 
strategic leadership with a clear vision that revitalises both the internal and external 
bureaucracy, and maintains the high level of funds directed to combat the disease.  
 
The ability of UNAIDS as an institution to do so is mired by the fragile context of 
leadership in which it was established. The lead agency for the global response to 
HIV/AIDS was initially the World Health Organisation (WHO) through its Global 
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Programme on AIDS (GPA), headed by Jonathan Mann. Mann was adept at articulating a 
rights-based approach to HIV/AIDS that established the foundations of the epidemic being 
seen as more than a health issue. However, this rights-based approach and the need to go 
beyond framing HIV/AIDS as a health issue ultimately led to the departure of Mann and the 
demise of GPA within the WHO. The appointment of Hiroshi Nakajima as Director-
General of the WHO in 1988 saw the resurgence of a public health approach to the 
institution’s operations, and crucially attempts to reign in the spending and autonomy of the 
GPA.14 Key to which was limiting the authority of Mann and the need to mainstream the 
GPA within the wider structures and programmes of the WHO. The combination of 
limiting GPA’s budget, reducing the programme’s autonomy, and bringing the GPA in line 
with the WHO’s regional structures and public health led to the resignation of Mann in 
1990. The resignation of Mann saw the beginnings of the WHO’s institutional decline. Up 
until this point the GPA had been successful in setting the right-based agenda, highlighting 
non-health specific issues such as stigma and the need for education, raising the profile of 
HIV/AIDS across the world, and providing an information exchange and advice for 
countries confronting their epidemics. However the loss of Mann and the change in 
direction saw the dissolution of GPA, and the removal of HIV/AIDS out of the WHO into 
a stand alone, UN co-ordinating agency: UNAIDS.15 UNAIDS, thus assumed a leadership 
role from the ashes of the GPA in the context of two competing approaches to HIV/AIDS 
that mark problems with its governance today: the contention between the need to treat the 
disease as an exceptional, development issue, or the need to address HIV and AIDS as a 
biomedical issue. Leadership within global HIV/AIDS governance thus comes to constitute 
a balancing act of competing demands under the banner of co-ordination, but also a need 
for direction in the absence of any over-arching authority. 
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The role of leadership within UNAIDS is important for the following reasons. First, it is the 
lead agency appointed by the UN to manage and co-ordinate the HIV/AIDS response. It 
has to provide co-ordination and direction for a significant number of donors, governments, 
civil society actors, and international bureaucrats through centralised and decentralised 
offices across the world. Second, it does not have the financial power to influence states as 
other actors within HIV/AIDS governance, such as the World Bank or the Global Fund to 
fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) may have. It thus has to exert a 
form of consensual soft power. Third, for many Peter Piot, was not only UNAIDS, but was 
the global response to the epidemic. It is thus integral to assess not only how he came to 
occupy this position in peoples minds, but the lessons of his leadership and their 
implications for the future of UNAIDS. In considering the international bureaucracy, the 
international system and member states in turn, this paper will consider how UNAIDS 
established clear policies and frameworks in which the current global HIV/AIDS response 
currently operates and the role of Piot’s leadership within this.  
 
International Bureaucracy 
The executive head’s relationship with top officials within the international bureaucracy is 
crucial to understanding leadership in international organisation. The role of top officials can 
often lead to conflicting poles of authority and divisions of loyalty that despite being present 
in most large organisations, when senior staff members garner external – i.e. member state – 
support for their position. The legal-institutional procedures within, combined with the 
collegial nature of, the international bureaucracy result in the executive head having limited 
authority over top official appointments and the sector of the bureaucracy’s work that is 
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allocated to them, giving some senior officials a large amount of influence and relative 
autonomy. Cox identifies three central ways of maintaining leadership among such 
conditions. First is the complete domination and centralization of power through making 
frequent changes in responsibility. Second, the executive head should preside over officials 
and promote communication and collective discussion whilst making ‘major decisions on 
policy after consultation rather than in consultation with his top officials.’ Third, the 
executive head should maintain a ‘reserved area of policy’ and construct effective personal 
staff coalitions. Matters that are not of direct concern should be delegated.16  
 
During his leadership, Piot was effective at both maintaining a centralised form of power, 
and loyalty among a select group of top officials. In line with Cox’s recommendations, Piot 
was able to do so through a combination of building a specific epistemic community that 
had its roots in the defunct GPA, and occupied a centralised form of leadership through his 
ability to set a clear agenda and priority areas for the institution. Upon his appointment, Piot 
identified in his own mind the need to give voice to people living with HIV ‘regardless of 
what states and co-sponsors and all the globe say, frankly, I couldn’t care less.’17 This voice 
and direction would be based upon scientific evidence where it exists, and specific values 
based upon human rights, and forms of equality such as gender equality. To put his agenda 
into practice, he adopted a medium term view and a short term view of what could be 
achieved and what to push for and when,18 and a reserved area of policy-making ‘that 
increasingly relied on informal brainstorming sessions involving knowledgeable and 
influential ‘outsiders’’.19 Hence, key to Piot’s leadership was the formation of a specific 
epistemic community, that resembled more of a broad alliance made up of colleagues from 
the GPA, as well as scientists and actors from civil society that were not necessarily from the 
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UN system. These actors form the current ‘gatekeepers’ of the global response to 
HIV/AIDS, and have come to occupy senior positions with the World Bank, the Global 
Fund, and the UN. Individuals such as Richard Feechem – ex Executive Director of the 
Global Fund, Jonathan Mann – former head of the GPA, and Debrework Zewdie – ex-
Director of the Global HIV/AIDS Program, World Bank and the current Deputy Executive 
Director of the Global Fund, have been crucial in shaping how states, intergovernmental 
organisations and civil society react to HIV/AIDS, and establishing the rights-based agenda 
for the disease alongside Piot. As Piot describes it ‘when AIDS started I was very young, I 
was about 30 something and so we were the young turks… no opportunism but we were 
passionate about it… but now they are still there, the same characters.’20 Leadership within 
the international bureaucracy cannot be solely attributed to Piot, but is shared among key 
individuals that have developed a prominent role for themselves and the institutions they 
represent. In coming together to form a coherent ‘one voice’ alliance, such senior figures are 
able to reinforce each others leadership and authority within their respective organisation. 
The success of establishing UNAIDS as the central co-ordinator of the global HIV/AIDS 
response, stems from the formation of alliances beyond a narrow epistemic community of 
experts to include civil society, the state and the private sector. It is such alliances that are 
fundamental to the effective management of member states and the maintenance of older, 
UN-based agencies at the forefront of leadership within the wider international system, as 
the paper discusses in more detail below. The buildings of alliances both within and outside 
of the institution were crucial components of Piot’s leadership of UNAIDS, as he describes 
the process 
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it is also about capitalising on alliances that have been made in the past. In the beginning it 
was very slow in building up but after a while you know who you can count on and who not, 
the ones who stab you in the back and the ones who have all the problems. But these 
alliances may change also, but I think that it is true for the UN system overall.21  
 
Important to the formation of such alliances was the need to establish legitimacy for 
leadership. This can be achieved through personality, and past working friendships, however 
a key factor for Piot’s legitimacy was his ability to carve out a specific functional expertise, 
using his agency as a microbiologist at the forefront of HIV/AIDS research: specifically in 
sub-Saharan Africa, where at the time of his appointment the impact of the disease was 
starting to unravel. Not only did Piot have the scientific credentials to develop legitimacy for 
his leadership role, he had a prominent position in identifying the ‘third epidemic’ of 
HIV/AIDS, that of the social, political and cultural reaction to the epidemic. As early as 
1988, Piot in partnership with Jonathan Mann had begun to frame HIV/AIDS more than 
just a health issue, but a rights-based, exceptional, development issue.22 Thus, not only did 
Piot use his scientific expertise to project a degree of legitimacy, he used it to extend the 
remit of debate associated with HIV/AIDS, and as a consequence expanded the mandate 
and relevance of UNAIDS. Piot framed UNAIDS as a non-health specific agency that had 
the credentials of scientific research and data collection combined with the necessary 
rhetoric and expertise of a development oriented institution.  
 
For Cox, agenda-setting and maintenance of a close-knit group of advisors must be balanced 
with the desire not to alienate important parts of the institution in regard to internal 
resistance to change and external influence that may lead to potential confrontation. The 
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only way for the executive head to overcome such inertia is to introduce new staff as a 
means of innovating new ideas.23 For Piot, this was relatively straightforward, as being the 
first Executive Director of UNAIDS he had a certain degree of autonomy to establish the 
foundations of the institution with a staff that he had developed. A principle means of 
overcoming inertia for Piot was to continue to broaden UNAIDS’ mandate and decentralise 
the institution’s operations to give regions and countries a degree of autonomy within the 
overarching framework set by the senior leadership in Geneva. Both regional and country 
teams have the room to articulate specific interests and develop joint advocacy programmes 
within the organisation24 within the guidelines set out by the Global Task Team on 
Improving AIDS co-ordination, established by UNAIDS’ secretariat and the United Nations 
Development Group.25 These guidelines extend to not only the UNAIDS bureaucracy, but 
all UN agencies working in-country on HIV/AIDS. They stress the need for greater clarity 
as to role and responsibilities, simplification and harmonization of UN support to the 
national response, and an over-arching commitment to the role of UNAIDS as the main co-
ordinator of the global response.26  
 
The evolution of UNAIDS from the GPA suggests the role of the international bureaucracy 
is vital to successful leadership as it is the basis for institutional support, direction, and 
organisational funding. The case of Piot suggests effectiveness within the international 
bureaucracy requires a combination of the type of skill and emotional intelligence Cox 
outlines, with legitimacy. Such legitimacy is drawn from personal background and expertise, 
but also the reinforcement of a wider epistemic community of both HIV/AIDS experts and 
health workers and senior figures within international institutions. A good grounding within 
the international bureaucracy both opens up and maintains the space in which UNAIDS is 
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able to operate in governing global health. The international bureaucracy provides the 
foundation for alliance formation that transcends narrow epistemic communities in specific 
institutions to encompass wider participation from the international system and member 
states. A lack of legitimacy and broad bureaucratic support will undermine any attempts at 
institutional change or relevance within the broad spectrum of the international system. 
 
Member States 
The second key relationship that Cox identifies as central to effective leadership is that 
between the executive head and member states. Cox identifies the relationship with member 
states as being the determinant of capability for action, initiative and political support. Such a 
relationship is fraught with difficulty as issues that are important to executive heads are rarely 
important to national governments who are more responsive to local political influences and 
international issues or problems that are seen as a threat to their national security. The 
interests of international organisations have to be aligned with the domestic interests of 
states, thus the executive head has to have an acute understanding of both global and 
domestic politics. The Executive Director of UNAIDS must form alliances with key donor 
states such as the US, states with high levels of HIV prevalence rates, specifically in sub-
Saharan Africa, and states with the threat of large epidemics such as Russia and China. To do 
so, according to Cox, the executive head requires i) political skill; ii) a personal confidential 
intelligence network involved in the domestic politics of key countries; and iii) the ability to 
compromise and to reconcile such compromise with ideological clarity and authority.27 
 
Member state interests as to how to effectively combat the disease, and the level of political 
commitment required to do so differ substantially. Getting government recognition and 
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public acknowledgement of a country’s HIV/AIDS epidemic is paramount to the work of 
UNAIDS. The Executive Director must manage two kinds of state relationship: i) that with 
countries with high HIV prevalence, often reliant on foreign aid to finance their health 
interventions; and ii) those member states that are large international donors. In regards to 
the first category, the executive head must first encourage state leaders to recognise their 
epidemic if necessary, before suggesting measures and means of addressing it. This has been 
problematic with particular states in sub-Saharan Africa that have either been in denial about 
the relationship between HIV and AIDS or denial as to the extent of the problem and its 
political ramifications. Of those states that have acknowledged the problem and are taking 
measures to treat and prevent HIV, UNAIDS has to represent and protect their ability to do 
so, and the knowledge and experience they offer to global policy-making. In this sense, 
UNAIDS must help such states elicit financial and political support for their HIV/AIDS 
interventions, whilst representing their interests and maintaining the policy space for them to 
direct and design their own programmes. The executive head must present themselves as an 
ally to such states or else threaten their sense of legitimacy, trust and autonomy from more 
powerful lender states. 
 
Whereas the relationship with the first kind of member state involves trust and the need to 
elicit political will, the second relationship involves both the need for political will, the 
resulting funds such will presents, and to manage the expectations and objectives of donor 
money. The US is perhaps the most difficult of member states the executive head engages 
with. George W. Bush’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has been 
very contentious within the HIV/AIDS community for its stress on abstinence-based 
prevention policies, and the restrictions it placed on funds towards family planning and 
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reproductive health organisations. PEPFAR is, however, the largest bilateral commitment to 
combating the disease, and hence, the influence it has over the epidemic’s governance at the 
global and national level is substantial. Whilst some of the more contentious aspects of 
PEPFAR have been addressed, the administration of Barack Obama has generated further 
controversy within the HIV/AIDS community in regards to potential cuts in funding.  
Having initially pledged an extra US$50billion of US money to combat HIV/AIDS by 2013, 
in practice Obama has only increased spending on HIV/AIDS by 2.5% as part of a wider 
strategy on global health. These two examples reflect the continuous problem for leaders of 
intergovernmental organisations: how to bridge the divide between words and deeds, and 
how to offer an opinion and provide leadership in reaction to contentious subjects whilst 
maintaining broad member state support. 
 
Beyond PEPFAR and bilateral global health initiatives, the US is home to large philanthropic 
foundations such as The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the William J. Clinton 
Foundation, the centre for biomedical research into methods of prevention and cure of HIV 
such as the Harvard AIDS Initiative, the American Foundation for AIDS Research 
(amFAR), and the National Institutes of Health, as well as new forms of anti-retroviral 
treatment developed by large pharmaceutical companies. The US government thus has 
multiple domestic interests in regard to company profit, the protection of property rights, 
and the promotion of the US as an altruistic global force for good. The Executive Director 
must find a balance between maintaining a working relationship with the US, whilst 
reflecting the interests and needs of the wider HIV/AIDS community of which the US is 
not exempt. Whilst the US is perhaps an extreme example, the executive head must manage 
these issues of balancing donor and borrower interests with a range of current donors– such 
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as the G8 countries – as well as courting potential new donors such as China and the United 
Arab Emirates.  
 
Piot would suggest that in practice such a balancing act requires a combination of alliance 
and coalition-building with states, intelligence networks and international organisations in-
country, and the use of the media and non-state actors in holding such states to account. As 
Piot describes it  
 
You have your friends, you have your enemies and you have the ones in-between. So you 
have to take care of your friends, you have to make sure your enemies don’t eat you and 
then the ones in-between you bring on your side and isolate your enemies28  
 
During his leadership, Piot used a variety of mechanisms to compromise and push member 
states in the pursuit of UNAIDS over-arching agenda through what he describes as a form 
of ‘convening power.’29 The first of which was alliance-building with the friends and enemies 
he described, and to develop institutional partnerships at the in-country level. This is 
specifically the case with the development of the National AIDS Council system of 
governance within countries. As co-ordinators of in-country responses, these government 
agencies are seen by UNAIDS as their country-counterparts, as ex-Country Co-ordinator for 
UNAIDS, Kenya, describes ‘when we are talking about our national counterpart we mean 
the national AIDS council, of course.’30 These councils help articulate and plan around the 
same directives and initiatives within UNAIDS, and are a key mechanism of member state 
alignment to the wider objectives of the institution. By building alliances with these councils, 
the leadership of UNAIDS is able to develop political will and enact specific policies from 
 16 
within the state. Similar to Haas’ understanding, developing policies alongside such councils, 
enables UNAIDS to integrate states with high HIV prevalence into the wider process of 
global decision-making and align policies to fit the institution’s over-arching objectives. This 
is done in a manner that promotes the collaborative ‘support’ role of UNAIDS put forward 
by in-country Directors and the Executive Director. The presentation of UNAIDS as an 
‘honest broker’ or intermediary between different states, more specifically, between 
borrower and donor states, makes the institution relevant to any form of co-ordination 
within the global response and thus confers legitimacy on the institution as an intermediary. 
The building of alliances with donor countries can be more complex at the global level, but 
similar to borrower states, predominantly occur at the in-country level. By decentralising 
authority and decision-making in implementation to Country Directors, the Executive Head 
builds power and legitimacy from the bottom-up.  
 
The second mechanism of managing member states is to exploit or manipulate their position 
or perceived position within the wider international system. Piot recognised the need for 
countries to gain the right kind of position within the international community and not to be 
outcast from the global HIV/AIDS agenda. Aware of this position, Piot’s role was two-fold; 
he had to raise the issue of HIV/AIDS to such a global public level that it could be used as a 
shaming device for member states where necessary, and then hold states to account for it. 
The Executive Director must be consistent and follow the same objectives and ideology 
among all states. When dealing with individual states, the head must establish what the 
boundaries are in regard to a particular issue and then push where necessary. For example, 
Piot addressed US interests in regard to the PEPFAR era, by both praising Bush’s state of 
union address in 2001, in which PEPFAR was announced, for setting a trend and changing 
 17 
‘the international perspective on AIDS funding in the western world’, as well as condemning 
wider aspects of the project, such as the suspension of funds to the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) on account of their work with family planning.31 Similarly, the 
executive head must identify an issue or initiative and stick with it despite various 
contentions between different states. For example, during his leadership, Piot put the need 
for an international consensus on what constitutes HIV prevention, despite contention with 
many different states over injecting drug users, abstinence, and homosexuality. For him, it 
was crucial to organise around one issue and then push for it. This organisational concept 
has been applied in practice through ‘The Three Ones’ co-ordinating mechanism. ‘The 
Three Ones’ relate to the need for one co-ordinating body, one strategic plan, and one 
monitoring and evaluation system in-country.32 In taking responsibility for the deployment 
of such a framework, the executive head re-asserts the leadership in co-ordination role of 
UNAIDS, and in so doing, their position within the organisation and the wider international 
system. Moreover, they align member states within a clear framework of governance 
underpinned by their own specific ideology for the institution. Those organisations that do 
not conform to ‘The Three Ones’ are subject to shaming mechanisms, have to operate on 
the sidelines of the global response, and thus are less adept at receiving international 
financial support or credibility. The central relationship for such shaming mechanisms to 
work and the building of a global strategy is that of the international system. 
 
The International System 
The international system is the final relationship relevant to the consideration of leadership 
in international organisation. The executive head’s perception of the international system 
and state actions and initiatives within it determines their role as either a prominent actor 
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with personal agency or as a ‘negotiator in ‘quiet diplomacy’.’33 For UNAIDS the 
relationship with the international system pertains to its engagement with its co-sponsors, 
non co-sponsors, and civil society organisations (CSOs). The magnitude of organisations 
involved with the delivery and agenda-setting of global HIV/AIDS concerns narrows and 
confuses the space for decision-making and the emergence of new ideas. The multiplicity of 
actors and initiatives has led to problems with co-ordination and direction within the 
response. These organisations exist in an arena marked by competition for funds, the need 
to demonstrate relevance and direction by asserting leadership as the lead agency within 
HIV/AIDS. To be effective the executive head has to ensure confidence of opinion, be 
identified with a definite ideology, have the acumen to be constructive, and have 
supplementary intelligence from outside the organisation.34 Most importantly, the executive 
head needs to build majorities in support of their policies and ideology whilst remaining 
independent of any form of coalition. One of the most basic qualifications for effective 
leadership thus is one of the oldest - mediation in negotiation.  
 
As an agency within the UN, with the specific mandate of co-ordination, the most important 
relationship for the Executive Director of UNAIDS is with the institution’s co-sponsors: the 
World Bank, the WHO, the ILO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, and 
UNESCO. UNAIDS has the role of co-ordinating the technical support of each of the co-
sponsors through the identification of ‘lead organisations’ and ‘main partners’ on specific 
issues, ‘The Three Ones’ at the in-country level and the Committee of Cosponsoring 
Organisations (CCO). The CCO functions as the main steering committee of UNAIDS: it 
reviews the budget, financial proposals and reports; it makes approval recommendations on 
aspects of the organisation and reports to the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB) as to 
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the mainstreaming of strategy and the activities of the co-sponsors.35 The CCO can be seen 
as a tool of the Executive Director in that it performs the necessary checks and balances for 
the institution and against each of the co-sponsors.  
 
Co-ordinating mechanisms by their very nature limit the scope of UNAIDS and the 
leadership of Piot. Within global health governance there is a drive towards the new and 
innovation, and the need to provide co-ordination for a range of activities and actors. 
Leadership within a co-ordinating agency such as UNAIDS must find the balance between 
co-ordination and mediation, and providing direction and autonomy separate from its co-
sponsors and member states. Leadership performs a key function in this for issue-based 
institutions such as UNAIDS to transcend the co-ordination trap, effective leadership must 
establish a clear mandate and institutional approach. In framing the HIV/AIDS response as 
both a biomedical and development issue, Piot effectively pushed the mandate of UNAIDS 
as a means of gaining greater relevance within the international system. The extension of 
UNAIDS mandate, and the role of Piot within this is clear when mapping UNAIDS’ 
flagship publication the AIDS Epidemic Update or ‘the global reports’ co-published with 
WHO. The earlier updates were mainly about data and information as to the status of the 
global epidemic, whereas come 2004, the updates included a preface from Piot noting the 
complexities of the epidemic and its response36 The 2004 report was the first all-out 
acknowledgement of UNAIDS’ extension to issues of feminization of the epidemic, its 
linkages with security – a crucial position for garnering wider state support, and the need to 
go beyond basic engagement with state actors, in other words, it made a clear distinction 
from the biomedical-approach favoured by the WHO.37  
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The main threat to the ability of the executive director of UNAIDS to set and sustain a clear 
agenda for HIV/AIDS is the role of non-co-sponsors. Non-co-sponsors are other UN 
agencies such as UNIFEM, UN-aligned funding bodies such as the Global Fund to Fight 
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, and philanthropic foundations such as The Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation. The increase in funds towards HIV/AIDS over the last ten years has 
seen a growth in the number of actors involved in its governance. Two central actors within 
this change in funding have been the Global Fund and The Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. Established as part of the 2001 United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) declaration, the Global Fund is very much a part of the 
UN system, and is firmly identified as a funding body only. Piot showed successful 
leadership in maintaining a clear articulation of the division of responsibilities between the 
Fund and UNAIDS since its inception and subsequent growth. The founding Executive 
Director of the Global Fund, Richard Feachem (2002-2007) was very much one of the 
gatekeepers of HIV/AIDS governance alongside a close knowledge network of experts with 
Piot, having been the Director of Health, Nutrition and Population at the World Bank (1995 
– 1999). The linkages between Feachem and Piot as part of a wider alliance organised around 
HIV/AIDS research in the early years of the disease generated ideological symmetry 
between the two executive heads whilst maintaining clearly delineated roles and 
responsibilities.  
 
Perhaps the most direct confrontation to the role of UNAIDS within the international 
system is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. As a private foundation run by the Gates 
family, the foundation does not, and does not have to be accountable to any actors. The 
Gates’ approach is very much to offer financial support underpinned by evidence-based 
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practice to states and non-state actors. Increasingly, actors have to fit in with the existing 
guidelines and approach, and research agenda of the Foundation.38 Hence, the Foundation 
has the financial weight and subsequent influence within the international system to operate 
outside of UNAIDS and ‘The Three Ones’. To effectively address such an issue, the 
executive head must both encourage participation and partnership with the Foundation, 
whilst at the same time form allegiances with multiple actors as a buffer to the influence of 
the Foundation. Similar to engagement with member states, the executive head must deploy 
media and shaming tactics towards issues of accountability, inclusion and participation 
within the Foundation, as well as using existing relations with individuals in other agencies 
and co-sponsors to continue to promote UNAIDS’ ideology. Legitimate leadership is crucial 
within this: UNAIDS has the legitimacy of the UN, member states and specific NGOs, and 
leadership credential of the executive director built upon personal background, state and 
non-state alliances, and perceived intermediary states. Legitimacy is something new actors 
such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation lack and is thus central to UNAIDS 
maintaining institutional space for its own existence and the interests of all its member 
states. The executive head must use such legitimacy at selected points to manage such 
relationships balanced with a wider awareness of the agency of such Foundations and the 
need to bring them on side with UNAIDS wider mechanisms and objectives. 
 
The third relationship the executive head must form within the international system is that 
of civil society. Civil society is integral to the autonomy of UNAIDS from member states 
and co-sponsors, as well as the mechanisms used by the Executive Director to manage such 
relationships and hold them to account. UNAIDS has a broad definition of civil society to 
include all non-state actors: commercial and non for profit organisations, and academic 
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institutions. Engagement with civil society at both the national and the global level involves 
liaison committees, information sharing, joint advocacy, and the sharing of best practice and 
planning ideas. At least one of UNAIDS’ Special Envoys tends to be drawn from civil 
society, and are thus representative within the executive leadership of the organisation. For 
example, Elizabeth Mataka, Special Envoy for AIDS in Africa, is the Executive Director of 
the Zambia National AIDS Network (ZNAN), and her predecessor, Stephen Lewis, is a 
prominent advocate and campaigner for improving the human condition and the rights of 
people living with HIV/AIDS and women. Beyond such formal structures, Piot encouraged 
representatives of civil society to contact him wherever possible, endeavouring to reply to 
emails, as well as ensuring a visit to civil society projects or meetings whenever in-country, 
specifically with people living with HIV.39 Mechanisms of engagement at the national level 
tends to be more inclusive of local civil society actors, whereas at the global level it is still 
dominated by organisations from the US as they ‘are much better organised.’40 Engagement 
with civil society by the executive head is an effective device to maintain their position at the 
forefront of new ideas and challenges emerging from the field. It extends their wider 
knowledge network, promotes alliance formation and assists in the trial of new ideas. Civil 
society and the media are effective tools for ‘going loud’ on contentious issues and shaming 
states into action. The backing and support of civil society infers wider legitimacy on the part 
of the executive head as they can have claims to interaction and relations with on-the-ground 
interventions and the wider HIV/AIDS community. It is this legitimacy and authenticity that 
is necessary for the exertion of soft power with the institution’s relationship with other 
actors in the international system, as well as member states and the international 
bureaucracy.  
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UNAIDS and Leadership 
The relationship between the executive director of UNAIDS and the international 
bureaucracy, member states and the international system reveals several issues facing 
international institutions and the role of leadership specifically. UNAIDS operates within a 
global system marked by large public and private financing, member state difference and 
denial, and an ensuing narrowing of political space in which to operate. Compliance with 
global health targets and funding pledges has long been a problem between state-based 
actors and intergovernmental organisations, but the presences of actors such as the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation with a budget triple that of the WHO makes co-ordination, joint 
commitments and adherence to global objectives difficult. As well as maintaining their own 
relevance to global issues, agencies such as UNAIDS must also help maintain the 
sovereignty of borrower state decision-making alongside the rights of their populations. 
UNAIDS represents a specific type of specialised agency which tends to be issue-based, with 
a co-ordinating mandate only and limited funding capacity or budget. These institutions 
come under the broad umbrella of the UN system which infers legitimacy but also limits 
their dynamism. Leadership is crucial to the relevance and longevity of such institutions. The 
executive head is the central point of legitimacy for a new institution and how it is arranged: 
it is their role to build support within the international bureaucracy, trust between and with 
member states, and alliances in the international system. This is important in the formation 
of the institution in shaping its ideology and approach to global issues, as well as providing 
the grounding for future institutional change and relevance in an ever-changing policy 
domain. Leadership that draws upon a broad alliance, personal knowledge and expertise 
creates legitimacy. Such legitimacy gives the executive head authority to set global agendas , 
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take risks, and provide a leadership role not only within a specific institution but the global 
alliance in which in operates.  
 
Alliances are essential to the balancing act institutions such as UNAIDS perform as a check 
on member state, non-state and bureaucratic power. Alliances outside the boundaries of 
individual institutions are paramount to their future development and sustenance, as well as 
ensuring the primacy of a specific issue of concern within the international community. The 
expertise of such alliances will help secure member state support and build trust, as well as 
offer guidance within the media as to what the issues are and how best to address them. To 
be successful alliances have to expand beyond the expert epistemic community to include a 
range of skills and opinion from the non-governmental and state sector. Alliances have 
drawn on resources from the media, civil society, states and institutions to maintain the high 
profile of HIV/AIDS as an exceptional issue, and thus the role of UNAIDS in being the 
expert co-ordinating agency in responding to this disease. In comparison, the GPA drew on 
a narrow epistemic community and failed to broaden the alliance to be inclusive of wider 
parts of the international system. Likewise, other global health issues such as malaria and 
tuberculosis have received less global attention than HIV/AIDS. These issues do have 
global alliances championing them in global policy-making; however what these alliances 
lack is a clear lead institution, and more importantly, a clear leader. 
 
The role of Piot shows that to maintain institutional relevance and legitimacy, leaders must 
balance ‘quiet’ or ‘soft’ diplomacy with ‘going loud’ and establishing a presence as a lead 
authority figure on the issue they represent. Combined with the shift of leadership from a 
specific institution to a wider alliance, this leads to a fundamental problem with institutional 
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leadership: whether leadership goes beyond the notion of path-dependent cumulative 
decision-making and the expression of a general position, to have an agency within 
international politics independent of an organisation. This poses a particular problem for 
UNAIDS with the departure of Piot. This problem reflects the domestic analogy between 
leaders of international institutions and state leaders: the predominance of the charismatic 
(male) leader, whom without the party, institution or country suffers. This is a narrow way of 
thinking about leadership in international institutions. As this article has argued, leadership is 
an integral component to the establishment and longevity of issue-specific co-ordinating 
agencies such as UNAIDS, but at the core of successful leadership is the removal of 
leadership from the institution into a broad alliance of states, institutions and non-state 
actors. Leadership should transcend the institution to develop a mutually reinforcing, 
legitimate, relationship between the institution and the alliance. Leadership has a specific 
agency within this relationship, but rests on skill, expertise, and legitimacy; less on notions of 
‘masculine’ charisma. The future of UNAIDS will depend on the current executive director, 
Michel Sidibe’s ability to build on the work of Piot and maintain such alliances and relevance 
of the institution in a changing playing field of HIV/AIDS funding, political will and global 
complacency towards the disease. 
 
Conclusion 
The role of leadership transcends the agency of simply opening up the black box of 
international organisations, it is a realm of political knowledge and agenda-setting that is 
integral to the formation and subsequent longevity of international institutions, and the 
alliances built around the global issues that justify their existence. The application of Cox’s 
framework to Peter Piot reveals several issues pertinent to the governance of HIV/AIDS 
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and global governance more broadly. Alliances drawn from epistemic communities are 
integral to the maintenance of legitimate leadership and institutional relevance in a 
competitive global policy area that is often dictated by those with the largest budget. 
Successful leaders must be at the centre of such alliances, and be pivotal in the establishment 
of their antecedents. The transcendence of executive power beyond institutions to the broad 
arena of global alliances suggests that leadership is a dispersed and non-institutional arena of 
authority. This notion requires further research, but it does indicate the importance of issue-
specific co-ordinating agencies such as UNAIDS to the study of global governance, 
specifically the mechanisms and strategies they develop to maintain relevance in a narrow 
space. Whilst the role and position of UNAIDS as the lead agency for HIV/AIDS co-
ordination is often under threat from competing interests and budget cuts, maintenance of 
alliances with the support of both a strong bureaucracy and member state trust will ensure its 
continued relevance. At the centre of managing these competing issues is the leadership of 
its Executive Director. 
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